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INTRODUCTION
The National Conference of State Legislatures has called campaign
finance disclosure the most basic form of campaign finance regulation
and further notes that “[a]ll states require some level of disclosure
from candidates, committees, and political parties of the amount and
One function of
source of contributions and expenditures.”1

* Dick Carpenter is a Professor of Leadership, Research, and Foundations in the
College of Education at the University of Colorado in Colorado Springs, CO. He is
also a director of strategic research at the Institute for Justice.
** Jeffrey Milyo is a Professor of economics at the University of Missouri in
Columbia, MO.
1. Campaign Finance Reform: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/campaign-financean-overview.aspx#Disclosure.
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campaign finance disclosure is to prevent corruption in candidate
elections.2 The manner in which disclosure may deter corruption is
not difficult to imagine. For example, disclosure reports may be
examined by investigative journalists and opposition researchers
looking for evidence of unsavory relationships between contributors
and candidates. Further, disclosure of contributions to candidates
may facilitate the enforcement of contribution limits in candidate
elections. After all, it would be difficult to know whether a
contribution limit has been violated without some accounting of how
much contributors have given to candidates.
In this Article, we question neither the desirability of creating
transparency in the ties between candidates and their contributors,
nor the efficacy of disclosure regulations in affecting this end. This is
despite the fact that several recent studies cast doubt on the extent to
which state campaign finance laws reduce either corruption or the
appearance of corruption.3 Rather, we focus on compelled disclosure
of political finances in non-candidate contexts, such as ballot measure
elections and grassroots issue advocacy. Grassroots issue advocacy is
“any effort to organize, coordinate or implore others to contact public
officials in order to affect public policy.”4 We argue that the
extension of disclosure regulations to political activities unrelated to
candidate elections cannot be justified in a similar way as a means to
prevent corruption. In non-candidate contests, there can be no
revelation of an unsavory relationship between a contributor and a
candidate because, simply, there is no candidate. Similarly, because
contribution limits do not exist outside of candidate elections,
disclosure cannot facilitate the enforcement of non-existent
contribution limits in non-candidate contexts.

2. JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE:
STRANGLING FREE SPEECH & POLITICAL DEBATE 18 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 119, 174 (2004); David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws
and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23, 38 (2006); Beth
Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of
Corruption, 8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 42 (2009); Adriana Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State
Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Political Corruption? (Jan. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Campaign Finance
Reforms Increase Trust and Confidence in State Government? (Apr. 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
4. JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., MOWING DOWN THE GRASSROOTS: HOW
GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DISCLOSURE SUPPRESSES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION,
Executive Summary (2010).
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Another argument for disclosure regulations in non-candidate
elections is that compelled disclosure of the finances of groups
engaged in non-candidate political activities provides voters with vital
information while at the same time imposing no real costs on those
groups.5 In our experience, this argument is a fairly conventional
view among advocates for increased disclosure, so for ease of
exposition, we will dub it “the conventional view” of disclosure.
However, we take issue with both elements of this view: first, that
disclosure provides vital information to the general public and,
second, that disclosure regulations impose little cost on political
speakers and groups.
We identify several challenges to the conventional view of
disclosure requirements. In short, there is little support from the
social scientific literature for the notion that compelled disclosure
generates important public benefits by augmenting voters’
knowledge. However, there is evidence that disclosure regulations
may impose significant costs on political activity. This does not
necessarily weigh against disclosure laws in candidate-centered
elections, as there still remains the anti-corruption rationale for such
regulations. Nevertheless, our findings do call into question the
rationale for extending compelled disclosure to other political
contexts.
The potential over-regulation of non-candidate political activities is
of serious concern. Ballot initiatives are an important tool for the
public to circumvent and discipline non-responsive elected officials,
as well as a means for increasing the public’s participation in politics,
knowledge of pertinent issues, and trust in government.6
Furthermore, “[g]rassroots lobbying is therefore not just the exercise
of free speech and association, but the very process by which likeminded people coordinate their efforts and petition government for
the redress of grievances.”7 Together, these non-candidate political
activities are the means by which many ordinary citizens become

5. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and
Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 298 (2005).
6. See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE:
THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE AMERICAN STATES 117 (2004).
7. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 2.
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actively engaged in politics and the route by which new political
entrepreneurs enter politics.8
In the next Part, we describe existing state disclosure laws in two
prominent non-candidate contexts: ballot measure elections and
grassroots issue advocacy. We then review the legal arguments for
compelled disclosure in these contexts, followed by the social science
literature as it pertains to the benefits and costs of compelled
disclosure. We conclude with a discussion of the lessons from the
social science literature and implications for practical reforms to state
disclosure regulations.
I. DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS IN THE STATES
Campaign finance disclosure laws are ubiquitous in candidate
elections in the states.9 Some states make it quite easy for interested
persons to search disclosure reports online.10 The National Institute
on Money in State Politics, a non-profit group located in Montana,
collects data from state disclosure reports and also maintains a
searchable database online.11
Given this archive, an Internet
connection, and a few clicks of a mouse, it is a trivial exercise to
discover that a Mr. Roy Bash, a lawyer residing in Mission Hills,
Kansas, contributed $500 to the re-election campaign of the
incumbent Governor of Missouri, Jeremiah Nixon, on June 30, 2011.12
Using the online searchable disclosure database created by the
Missouri Ethics Commission, it is also quite easy to verify this
information and even obtain such personal information as Mr. Bash’s
home street address and the identity of his employer.13 As we noted
at the start, it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the

8. See JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUST., KEEP OUT: HOW STATE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS ERECT BARRIERS TO ENTRY FOR POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 7–8
(2010).
9. See Primo & Milyo, supra note 3, at 29.
10. For example, the state of Illinois permits online searches of disclosure reports.
See ILL. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.il.gov/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2013).
11. See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/ (last
visited Mar. 6, 2013).
12. See Contributor Summary: BASH, ROY, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL.,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/contributor_details.phtml?d=1
381511515 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
13. See All Contributions & Expenditures Search, MISS. ETHICS COMMISSION,
http://www.mec.mo.gov/EthicsWeb/CampaignFinance/CF12_ContrExpend.aspx
(search Year: “2012”; Last Name: “Bash”; First Name: “Roy”) (last visited Mar. 25,
2013).
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benefits and costs of such readily available information about
contributors to candidates. However, as we show below, several
states also apply similar disclosure requirements to activities not
directly connected to candidates.
A. Ballot Measure Elections
Every state and most localities permit some form of direct
legislation through popular vote, from constitutional amendments to
non-binding advisory measures.14 The most commonly employed of
these ballot-measure procedures are initiatives, or proposals for new
laws or constitutional amendments placed on the ballot via popular
petition.15 Twenty-four states use initiatives, including many of the
largest states by population: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Missouri, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, and
Washington.16
In two recent reports, Jeff Milyo examines state disclosure
requirements in ballot measure elections.17 In general, states apply
very similar disclosure rules to candidate elections and ballot measure
elections. In Table 1, infra, we reproduce selected disclosure
requirements and the minimum dollar thresholds that trigger these
reporting requirements in all twenty-four of the initiative states.18 In
other words, individuals and groups that advocate for or against a
ballot measure must register as a political committee if they collect or
spend in excess of a minimum dollar threshold.19 Registration also
involves naming a treasurer who will be subject to punishment for
violations of reporting requirements.20 As indicated in Table 1, in
most such states, the thresholds of activity that trigger registration
requirements are $500 or less. The states with higher triggers for
registration are: California ($1000), Illinois ($3000), Maine ($5000),
Nebraska ($5000), and Nevada ($10,000).21 However, several states
require registration for any amount of activity; these are:

14. See State I&R, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. U. S. CAL.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013)
(providing up-to-date information on ballot-measure procedures in the states).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See MILYO, supra note 8, at 20, 22, 25–26; MILYO, supra note 2, at 5–14.
18. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
19. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 9–10.
20. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 5.
21. See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
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Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming.22
In every state, contributor names and addresses must be reported
for aggregate contributions over a minimum threshold that ranges
from $0 to $1000, with more than half of the states setting this
disclosure threshold at $50 or less.23 In addition, all but seven
initiative states also require employer/occupation information from
contributors.24 The states that do not require employer information
are: Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wyoming.25 Finally, among the initiative states, only
South Dakota does not require itemization of expenditures; most
states set the threshold for itemizing expenditures at $100 or less.26
However, Alaska, Arizona, Montana, and Wyoming require all
expenditures to be itemized, regardless of amount.27
Political committees that fail to comply with these extensive
disclosure requirements may be subject to fines and even criminal
penalties.28 Further, because disclosure reports are filed multiple
times throughout the year, the failure to correct a past oversight can
lead to the accumulation of large fines.29 For example, in just this
way, one ballot measure committee in California racked up over
$800,000 in fines despite the fact that the maximum penalty per
violation was only $2,000 and the committee had only raised and
spent just over $100,000.30
B.

Grassroots Issue Advocacy

Grassroots issue advocacy is the act of political organizing through
communications to the general public.31 This activity may entail
exhortations for members of the public to contact their elected
officials in regard to some policy concern.32 Regardless of the
presence of such exhortations, though, grassroots issue advocacy is

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
See infra Table 1 (citing MILYO, supra note 8).
MILYO, supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Id.
MILYO, supra note 4, at 2–4.
Id. at 3–4.
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often described as “grassroots lobbying” or “outside lobbying.”33 We
use these terms interchangeably throughout. And while such
grassroots communications are far removed from the activities of
hired guns that roam state capitol buildings, several states
nevertheless regulate grassroots lobbying as if it were a form of
traditional and direct lobbying of legislators.34
In a recent report, Milyo examines state regulation of grassroots
lobbying.35 In Table 2, infra, we reproduce a list of states by the ways
in which they define lobbying activities.36 Lobbying of public officials
is regulated in every state, as well as at the federal level.37 In general,
persons engaged in lobbying activities that exceed a threshold of
activity must register and file periodic reports on their activities.38 As
indicated in Table 2, however, only fifteen states, including Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio, and Texas, define lobbying simply as “direct
communication with public officials.”39 Twenty-two states define
lobbying more broadly so as to include indirect communication with
public officials.40
In these states (e.g., California, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia), persons and groups that
communicate with the public about policy issues and encourage
people to contact government officials are considered to be engaged
in lobbying.41 But in the remaining fourteen states (e.g., Florida,
Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Washington), any communication
with the public about policy issues meets the definition of lobbying.42
As should be apparent, “grassroots lobbying” is a somewhat
misleading term because communicating indirectly with public
officials is quite unlike lobbying in the traditional sense. A more
accurate and descriptive term for indirect lobbying is “grassroots
issue advocacy,” inasmuch as the action being regulated is
communicating to the public at large, not the subsequent actions of
individuals that may contact public officials.43

33. See KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION & INTEREST
GROUP STRATEGIES 3–4 (1998).
34. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8–10.
35. See generally id.
36. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8).
37. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 7–8).
38. MILYO, supra note 4, at 9.
39. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8).
40. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4).
41. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 8.
42. See infra Table 2 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 8).
43. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8–10.
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In Table 3, infra, we reproduce a list of the threshold activity levels
that trigger reporting requirements for grassroots issue advocacy in
the thirty-six states that regulate this activity.44 As with ballot
measure disclosure, persons and groups engaged in grassroots issue
advocacy campaigns that meet some threshold of activity typically
must register as lobbyists and file periodic reports.45 Such reports
typically require disclosure of any specific legislative or regulatory
interests, as well as itemized expenditures (and contributions if
applicable).46 The dollar threshold for itemizing varies by state; for
example, the state of Washington requires that “grassroots lobbyists”
itemize contributions over $25.47 Also, as with ballot measure
committees, failure to comply with grassroots lobbying disclosure
requirements can result in civil and criminal penalties.48
II. WHY DISCLOSURE?
The ground rules for government regulation of political campaigns
were set more than thirty-five years ago in the landmark Supreme
Court decision of Buckley v. Valeo.49 The Court ruled that
regulations may not unduly burden First Amendment rights and must
be narrowly tailored to prevent the “actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.”50
This standard begs the question of how to define corruption, but the
Court has been fairly consistent in defining corruption as direct
exchanges of cash for political favors and the like (i.e., bribery and
influence-peddling).51
Given that corruption requires an explicit quid pro quo, it follows
that campaign contribution limits may be imposed on political
committees that receive or make contributions in candidate elections,
but not on candidates that choose to self-finance. This is because a
candidate cannot corrupt herself with her own funds. Similarly,
although a large contribution may influence the actions of a candidate
in office, the plain language of a ballot proposition cannot be
influenced in the same way. It is no surprise then that states neither

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See infra Table 3 (citing MILYO, supra note 4, at 10).
MILYO, supra note 4, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17–18.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Id. at 26.
See Cordis & Milyo, supra note 3, at 6.
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limit contributions to ballot measure committees nor impose limits on
grass roots issue advocacy campaigns because these activities do not
directly involve a candidate that could be party to a quid pro quo
transaction.
A. The Transparency Rationale for Disclosure Laws
The conventional rationale for disclosure laws is that transparency
itself is a desirable end.52 Indeed, this is seen clearly in legislative
declarations of intent attached to lobbying and campaign finance
statutes in several states.53 For example, consider the language of
Rhode Island’s law:
Public confidence in the integrity of the legislative process is
strengthened by the identification of persons and groups who on
behalf of private interests seek to influence the content,
introduction, passage, or defeat of legislation and by the disclosure
of funds expended in that effort.54

Another example is found in this declaration from the state of
Washington:
The public’s right to know of the financing of political campaigns
and lobbying and the financial affairs of elected officials and
candidates far outweighs any right that these matters remain secret
and private.55

The strength of these claims is disconcerting in two respects. First,
the almost casual dismissal of a right to privacy ignores the Supreme
Court’s repeated recognition that mandatory disclosure can impose
unacceptably high costs on certain disfavored groups and speakers.56
Second, not only are there are no empirical studies of the efficacy of
disclosure in non-candidate contexts on corruption or public
confidence in government, but more generally, there is little support
for the notion that campaign finance regulations have such salutary
effects.57

52. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5. But see MILYO, supra note 2, at 19.
53. MILYO, supra note 4, at 8.
54. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 22-10-1(b) (West 2012).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.010 (West 2012).
56. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
57. For a discussion of recent studies that cast doubt on the efficacy of state
campaign finance reforms as a means of preventing corruption or improving public
opinion of state government, see sources cited supra note 3.
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Rather than assuming that disclosure in non-candidate contexts
yields great social benefits at little cost, we review the social science
research on disclosure for evidence that speaks to the benefits and
costs of disclosure in non-candidate contexts. The motivation for this
exercise is our contention that in the spirit of Buckley, there is a need
to demonstrate that such laws not only generate some benefit from
disclosure laws in non-candidate contexts, but also that such laws
impose no burden on the freedoms of speech and association or the
right to petition.
As discussed in greater detail below, the most prominent purported
benefit of transparency through disclosure in the non-candidate
context is a more informed electorate: transparency produces
information that voters need or want in order to make an informed
vote.58 Proponents of this view also assert that disclosure laws place
no real burden on political speech or association, so there is no
meaningful impediment to persons or groups exercising their First
Amendment rights.59 These claims of informational benefits at no
cost will be examined more closely in the next section.60
But in general, is more transparency in politics always better than
less? Apparently not, as the existence of the secret ballot is one
example where privacy concerns are widely perceived to trump any
potential benefits from public disclosure of citizen’s votes in
elections.61 The rationale for the secret ballot is that this mechanism
makes it more difficult to bribe, intimidate, or otherwise coerce
citizens to vote a certain way and protects citizens from reprisals by
persons with contrary political views.62
As a further demonstration that disclosure entails some costs,
consider the nature of information that is and is not disclosed under
current laws. Details such as home address and employer provide
some information about contributors, but might voters want to know
more about contributors’ beliefs and associations? Why not compel
disclosure of union and interest group membership, religion, race, or
even sexual preference? Clearly, there is some boundary where

58. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 295.
59. See Richard Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age (Univ. Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 2011-46, 2012).
60. See infra Part III.
61. See generally Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter
Turnout Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1995).
62. Id. at 107–08.
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privacy becomes more important than the public’s right to know
details about who supports or opposes an issue.
These examples suffice to demonstrate that transparency is not an
unquestionable end in itself, but may also entail some costs.
Consequently, transparency must be evaluated as a means toward
some policy goal. This requires some weighing of costs and benefits
of disclosure laws in practice.
III. LESSONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE
Among proponents for increased regulation of campaign finances,
disclosure in the non-candidate context is widely supported as an
effective and low-cost vehicle for achieving the purported benefit of a
better-informed electorate.63 As disclosure advocates Elizabeth
Garrett and Daniel Smith describe: “Disclosure is crucial to ensuring
and improving voter competence in initiative and referendum
elections.”64
The argument for disclosure relies on a simplistic application of the
theory of heuristics, or cognitive cues in political science.65 The basic
notion is that voters spend little time and attention finding and
processing information to make an informed vote.66 Therefore,
according to disclosure enthusiasts, policymakers can improve voter
competence by creating an information environment that provides
citizens with “cues” or informational shortcuts that will help them
vote competently. Mandatory disclosure is alleged to be such a cue.67
The logic is this: through mandatory disclosure, voters can see who
supports and opposes ballot issues.68 Based on voters’ opinions of
those supporters, voters receive a cue on how they might vote on
issues.69 For example, suppose the National Rifle Association (NRA)
gives money to a campaign supporting hypothetical ballot Proposition
20. A voter discovers this, and because she holds a negative opinion

63. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296; see also Hasen, supra note 59, at 4.
64. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296.
65. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994).
66. Id. at 63.
67. Michael Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141,
1170 (2003).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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about the NRA, she votes against Proposition 20 under the premise
that she likely would oppose anything that the NRA supports.
Several scholars argue that ballot measure contests are particularly
challenging for voters compared to candidate elections.70 Ballot
measures can be complex and voters often have little information
about how a specific policy will translate into policy outcomes.71 Also,
in candidate elections, voters have the benefit of political party
“brand names” attached to each candidate, which are particularly
powerful and informative cues.72 For these reasons, disclosure of
campaign contributors to ballot measure committees is thought to be
particularly valuable information for most voters.73
A case for disclosure of grassroots advocacy can be made along
similar lines, although we are unaware of any scholars that make such
an argument. Instead, all of the relevant empirical studies examine
ballot measure committees.74 It is probably safe to infer from this
dearth of attention to disclosure regulations applied to grassroots
issue advocacy that scholars have considered this a less important
policy area than disclosure for ballot measure contests.75

70. See Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Do Voters Have a Cue? Television
Advertisements as a Source of Information in Citizen-Initiated Referendum
Campaigns, 41 EUR. J. POL. RES. 777, 777 (2002); Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at
297.
71. See sources cited supra note 70.
72. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 297; see generally Robert Huckfeldt et al.,
Accessibility and the Political Utility of Partisan and Ideological Orientations, 43 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 888 (1999).
73. See Kang, supra note 67, at 1166.
74. See, e.g., Lupia, supra note 65; cf. Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When

Do Cues Eliminate Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated
Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009) (a generalized empirical study, the results of which
may apply to both ballot issue or candidate contexts).
75. We make this inference based on the theory of issue salience, which is
explained in Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 66, 66 (2000). Issue salience measures how important or prominent an issue
is among various audiences. A common way to measure issue salience is to count the
number of articles or publications created on a given issue. See, e.g., Donald P.
Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights:
Expanding the Scope of the Conflict, 58 J. POL. 332, 339 (1996) (measuring issue
salience by counting the number of articles on gays and lesbians per 100,000
population that appear for each state between 1985 and 1993 on the Newsbank
Electronic Information System; the greater the number of articles, the more
important, or salient, an issue is considered to be). Applied here, we infer that
grassroots issue advocacy is considered a topic of low importance or salience among
scholars given the paucity of sources devoted to it.

CARPENTER & MILYO_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

NON-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS

5/27/2013 7:21 PM

615

Meanwhile, possible costs associated with disclosure are seldom, if
ever, given serious attention.76 Again, seen through the lens of
revealed preference, this lack of scholarly attention indicates what
might appear to be a widely held consensus about the benign nature
of disclosure.77 Yet, even proponents of disclosure have noted
possible costs: “Concern about individuals’ First Amendment rights is
heightened when statutes require disclosure of such information as
the contributors’ occupations and employers.”78 Further, these same
authors note that “[d]isclosure will certainly chill some speech,
particularly from groups that fear voter backlash in the election.
Moreover, regulation imposes costs of compliance that can be
significant for smaller organizations.”79 Yet, in a thirty-four page
article on disclosure specifically in the ballot issue context, those
statements represent the total attention paid to possible costs
associated with disclosure.80 Amidst a list of recommendations in the
article, not one calls for research on potential costs.81
There is not only a lack of empirical attention to the issue of
disclosure costs. The alleged benefits in the non-candidate context
are frequently discussed but rarely examined empirically. Indeed,
even
the
aforementioned
proponents
acknowledge
that
“[n]otwithstanding . . . broad support, disclosure statutes have not
received much scholarly attention.”82 Until recently, for example, no
one bothered to ask if disclosure laws actually provide any
informational benefit over and above information already available to
voters. Similarly, no attempt was made to measure to what extent
information produced by disclosure was actually used. Specific to
costs, Garrett and Smith rightly identified possible costs associated
with disclosure—chilled speech and participation—but up until the
research published within the past five years, empirical examinations
of such costs were almost non-existent.
76. For two recent exceptions, see Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance
Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 276 (2010); Lloyd Mayer, Disclosures About
Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 271–80 (2010).
77. See Richard Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV.
265, 266 (2000) (“In the endless debate between supporters and opponents of
campaign finance limits, the one thing both sides seem to have agreed upon is the
need for effective disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures.”).
78. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 326.
79. Id. at 304.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 295.
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Recent research challenges the conventional wisdom about
purported benefits of disclosure and reveals costs that are anything
but benign. Each of those studies is discussed in some detail below,
beginning with research on alleged benefits and then moving to costs.
Note that the focus is on disclosure in the non-candidate context.
This Article does not review works on costs associated with disclosure
in the candidate context.83
A. Re-Examining the Value of Cues
Decades of survey research have established that American voters
possess low levels of information regarding politics.84 So low, in fact,
that many prominent scholars have questioned whether democratic
institutions can be trusted to accurately reflect the interests of
citizens.85 However, in a seminal study, Arthur Lupia argued that
voters employ cognitive shortcuts, or heuristic cues, as effective
substitutes for encyclopedic information about candidates or issues.86
Lupia analyzed voter knowledge and behavior in a California
election that involved several competing ballot initiatives on
reforming auto insurance in the state.87 Despite the complexity of the
ballot measures, Lupia found that voters who were aware of the
sponsors of the initiatives voted similarly to those that could correctly
answer some factual questions about the initiatives.88 However, the
frequent interpretation that cues allow voters to vote as if they were
well-informed involves some heroic leaps of logic.

83. For a discussion of costs associated with disclosure in the candidate context,
see BIPARTISAN COMM’N ON THE POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1974, OVERLY
COMPLEX AND UNDULY BURDENSOME: THE CRITICAL NEED TO SIMPIFY THE
POLITICAL REFORM ACT 23–33 (2000); Alexandre Gagnon & Filip Palda, The Price

of Transparency: Do Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Discourage Political
Participation by Citizens’ Groups?, 146 PUB. CHOICE 353 (2011); David Schultz,
Disclosure Is Not Enough: Empirical Evidence from State Experiences, 4 ELECTION
L.J. 349, 349–50 (2005); Randolph Sloof, Campaign Contributions and the
Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws, 11 ECON. & POL. 83 (1999); Hanming Fang et
al., An Experimental Study of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Transparency,
Donations, and Policy Choices (June 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
84. See generally MICHAEL DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996).
85. See Philip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 219 (David Apter ed., 1964).
86. See Lupia, supra note 65, at 63.
87. Id. at 67.
88. Id. at 70–71.
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First, in Lupia’s study, so-called well-informed voters were not
necessarily informed about the policy consequences of the insurance
reform measures on which they were voting. For example, it is one
thing to know that a reform proposal will roll back insurance
premiums, but quite another to understand how such a proposal will
affect the market for automobile insurance over the long run. Thus,
there is no guarantee that so-called informed voters are in fact voting
“correctly.” Second, the informed voters in Lupia’s study also had
access to cognitive cues about which interest groups were sponsoring
which measure. Consequently, it is quite possible that these voters
were also basing their voting decisions on cues—again, not necessarily
voting “correctly”.
Apart from the logical challenges to the hypothesis that heuristic
cues substitute perfectly for information, subsequent studies have
yielded decidedly mixed results.89 While it is clear that voters make
use of cues such as party labels and major endorsements, it is by no
means clear that voters make systematically better choices as a
result.90 More importantly for our purposes, the empirical literature
has focused on cues like political party and endorsements, not details
of contributor information.91 A major difference between these
different types of cues should not be missed: party labels and
endorsements are disclosed to voters willingly. State disclosure laws
compel disclosure of information when some unpopular groups may
prefer to remain anonymous.92 Advocates of disclosure almost always
89. For a recent review, see Cheryl Boudreau & Scott MacKenzie, Informing the
Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion About
Initiatives (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See also Shaun Bowler &
Todd Donovan, Information and Opinion Change on Ballot Propositions, 16 POL.
BEHAV. 411, 411 (1994) [hereinafter Bowler & Donovan, Ballot Propositions];
Bowler & Donovan, supra note 70, at 788; Mark Forehand et al., Endorsements as
Voting Cues: Heuristic and Systematic Processing in Initiative Elections, 34 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2215, 2228 (2004); Mark R. Joslyn & Donald Haider-Markel,

Guns in the Ballot Box: Information, Groups, and Opinion in Ballot Initiative
Campaigns, 28 AM. POL. Q. 355, 356 (2000).
90. See Geoffrey Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 819 (2003);
Wendy Rahn, The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing About
Political Candidates, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 472, 492 (1993); Ellen D. Riggle et al., Bases
of Political Judgments: The Role of Stereotypic and Nonstereotypic Information, 14
POL. BEHAV. 67, 81 (1992).
91. Examples of studies on cues from party and endorsements include Forehand
et al., supra note 89; Huckfeldt et al., supra note 72.
92. See Jessica Garrison, Gay Marriage Foes Want Campaign Contributions
Anonymous, Citing ‘Harassment,’ L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2009, 5:42 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/01/proponents-of-1.html.
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consider a scenario in which a nefarious group fools the public by
hiding its identity.93 However, it is also possible that compelled
disclosure ignites prejudice in listeners that might have been avoided
had the speaker been able to remain anonymous. For all these
reasons, proponents of compelled disclosure err in assuming that
disclosure necessarily provides valuable information to voters.
It is by no means clear that voters can or will use disclosed details
about financial activities of groups in a fashion that improves their
decision-making.94 Further, given the easy availability of other more
powerful cues, such as party labels and endorsements, it is by no
means clear that there is any marginal value to be gained from the
details of financial activities of groups. Recent research reviewed
below suggests there is not.
B.

Re-Considering the Benefits of Disclosure

In 2010, David Primo completed a study that examined the

marginal benefit of disclosure.95 We emphasize “marginal” because
Primo was interested in examining the specific benefit of disclosure
over and above information already available to voters without
disclosure.96 This is an important distinction because, despite
assertions that ballot issue elections are “low-information”
environments,97 results from Primo and others (as discussed below)
suggest that voters often have an abundance of information during
ballot issue elections. Therefore, Primo measured the informational
value added specifically by disclosure.98
To do so, he “designed an experiment where participants had the
chance to vote on a ballot issue, but different groups were given
access to different information about the issue.”99 This “allowed
[him] to assess three aspects of voter behavior in ballot issue
campaigns.”100 “First, are voters interested in information about

93. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 296.
94. DICK M. CARPENTER, INST. FOR JUST., DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION 11–12 (2007).
95. DAVID PRIMO, INST. FOR JUST., FULL DISCLOSURE: HOW CAMPAIGN FINANCE
DISCLOSURE LAWS FAIL TO INFORM VOTERS AND STIFLE PUBLIC DEBATE (2011).
96. Id. at 11.
97. Bowler & Donovan, supra note 70, at 779.
98. PRIMO, supra note 95, at 14.
99. Id.
100. Id.

CARPENTER & MILYO_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:21 PM

NON-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS

619

ballot issues?”101 “Second, and related, are voters interested in
disclosure information?”102 “Third, does viewing disclosure
information improve the ability of voters to identify the positions of
interest groups on a ballot issue, once the other information they
access is taken into account?”103 If so, one could surmise that
disclosure can provide unique cues useful in deciding how to vote.
A sample of 1,066 registered voters in Florida was presented with a
hypothetical ballot issue in an online survey concerning taxes and
illegal immigration, similar to Colorado’s ballot in 2006.104
Then, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups,
A, B, or C. Group A was immediately provided with the
opportunity to vote yes, no, or unsure on the ballot issue. . . .
Groups B and C were then presented with headlines that linked
to a series of newspaper articles, as well as links to a voter guide and
two advertisements.105

Groups B and C differed in that Group C had access to two
additional newspaper articles which contained information that was
almost surely obtained by the reporter through campaign finance
disclosure (e.g., the amount of a particular contribution).106
Once individuals in groups B and C were done reviewing the
information of their choice, they voted and were then given the
following prompt:
Below is a list of groups that have taken or could take a position on
this ballot issue. Based on your existing knowledge of the issue, as
well as any information obtained during this survey, please assess
the likely position of each group on this ballot issue.107

Respondents were then asked to indicate whether the group
supported or opposed the initiative.108
The results were twofold. First, “respondents with access to
information about the ballot issue viewed very little of it.”109
Approximately 40% of those in groups B and C chose not to view any
information at all, and approximately 35% viewed only one to three

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.

CARPENTER & MILYO_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

620

5/27/2013 7:21 PM

[Vol. XL

items.110 Among those who did view information, the single most
popular item was the voter guide—a document similar to guides
created and distributed by state agencies during election seasons.111
The least viewed items were the two articles available only to Group
C that contained campaign finance disclosure information.112 One of
the articles was headlined “Elite Donors Fuel Ballot Initiatives,”
clearly indicating the story discussed well-known donors.113 Yet,
despite the alleged importance of campaign finance information that
would be created by disclosure, “[r]espondents preferred to read any
other material . . . rather than an article featuring campaign finance
information.”114 Moreover, those who read the “Elite Donors” article
read three times more references than those who did not.115
According to Primo, this suggests “voters who access campaign
finance information are the least likely to need it to make informed
choices.”116
Second, in the comparison of the average number of interest
groups correctly identified by each group, respondents in Groups A
and B were virtually identical, while Group C—the group with access
to sources with disclosure-related information—correctly identified
more interest groups than those in A or B.117 At first consideration,
this result appears to suggest that because respondents in Group C
were the most successful in identifying interest groups, and because
they were the only ones with access to disclosure-related information,
the result must come from disclosure.118 Primo notes, however, that
this is not the case.119 While only members of Group C had access to
disclosure information, not all of them took advantage of this extra
information.120 In fact, most did not.121 To isolate the effect of
viewing disclosure information, Primo accounted for differences in
viewing behavior by separating members of each group by the kind of

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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information they viewed.122 In so doing, he found that respondents
who viewed the voter guide—no matter what other information they
viewed—were most successful in identifying the positions of interest
groups.123 Viewing disclosure information, on the other hand, had
almost no impact.124
Clearly, Primo’s findings contradict the primary purported benefit
of disclosure—providing much-needed information to the
electorate125—and further evidence in his report combined with other
research appears to indicate the source of the discrepancy.126 Simply
stated, disclosure-related information is superfluous.127 Voters enjoy
an abundance of information about ballot issues.128 Moreover,
numerous interest groups clamor for attention in order to tell citizens
how to vote.129
In a simple demonstration, Primo chose a 2010 ballot issue in
Florida—Amendment 4—and performed a Google search on the
proposed amendment.130 The result was a flood of information.131 He
discovered position statements by the Chamber of Commerce, the
Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association, the Realtors
association, the Audubon Society of the Everglades, Clean Water
Action, Friends of the Everglades, the Sierra Club of Florida, FL
Public Interest Research Group (Florida PIRG), and the Save the
Manatee Club.132 As Primo concludes,
All of this information came from press releases or statements on
the websites of groups involved in the initiative and was not related
to government-forced disclosure. Yet, from these simple searches
that took minutes to perform, I learned that environmentalists and
interests opposed to development were on one side of the issue, and
development supporters were on the other.133

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Briffault, supra note 76, at 273.
For an example of other research, see Dick M. Carpenter, Mandatory

Disclosure for Ballot-Initiative Campaigns, 13 INDEP. REV. 567 (2009).
127. See PRIMO, supra note 95, at 19.
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
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Similarly, Carpenter amassed information available to Colorado
voters in 2006 on all of that year’s state ballot issues.134 Using
LexisNexis, ProQuest, general internet searches, and searches of
state-based think-tanks, he found that from January 1 through
November 7, 2006 (Election Day), voters had access to more than one
thousand pieces of information that dealt with ballot issues.135 This
information ranged from newspaper stories, to the state voter guide,
to policy papers and briefs created by think tanks.136 Not included
were countless advertisements and position statements made by
campaigns and interest groups at the time but that were largely
unrecorded for posterity. It seems little wonder, then, that disclosurerelated information would appear to have little marginal utility.
Particularly interesting about all of these sources was how little of
it made any mention of information likely produced by disclosure.137
Less than 5% of newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the
editor, think tank and nonprofit material, state-produced
documentation, and campaign-generated documentation referenced
disclosure information.138 That figured dropped to 3.4% in the two
weeks leading up to the election.139
This finding was consistent with another study that examined
articles for state-level campaign finance from 194 newspapers
covering all 50 states from 2002 to 2004.140 The author found that
each newspaper averaged only about three stories per year regarding
campaign finance.141 And less than 20% of those stories fell into the
category of “analysis”—the category that would provide information
about contributors to campaigns.142
What makes these small percentages so telling is the assertion that
“information entrepreneurs”—which include news media, think
tanks, and other groups that disseminate information—report soughtafter disclosure information to voters who value such data but lack
the time necessary to track it down (despite the fact that disclosure
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Carpenter, supra note 126, at 574.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Raymond La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign
Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 237
(2007).
141. Id. at 242.
142. Id.
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data are easily available on state websites).143 Yet, these recent
studies demonstrate something quite different: Information about
who contributes to ballot issues and other statewide races is not, in
fact, used extensively by information entrepreneurs in communicating
with voters. If disclosure-related information were indeed as vitally
beneficial as campaign finance reformers claim, it seems that demand
by information consumers would compel information entrepreneurs
to provide it in more abundance, but amidst a superfluity of
information available to voters, disclosure data does not appear all
that useful.144 Taken together, these studies suggest that the marginal
social value of current financial disclosure in non-candidate contexts
is approximately nil. Yet, research reviewed below suggests the
potential costs are anything but.
C.

Re-Considering the Costs of Compelled Disclosure

The costs of disclosure fall into three broad categories: 1) the risk
of harassment to individuals based on disclosed information;145 2) the
red-tape costs of compliance to political groups and political
entrepreneurs;146 and 3) the deterrent effects of harassment and redtape costs on political organization and activity.147 Only recently have
scholars begun to take seriously the task of investigating the
magnitudes of these costs. Even so, unlike the empirical studies that
call into question the actual benefits resulting from compelled
disclosure, recent research indicates that the costs may be more than
trivial.148
One measure of chilled speech and political association resulting
from state disclosure laws comes from Carpenter’s 2009 survey of
more than two thousand voters in six states in the weeks leading up to
the 2006 elections.149 When asked about support for disclosure
generally, more than 82% of respondents expressed approval for
mandatory disclosure.150 However, once asked about whether their

143. Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 297.
144. PRIMO, supra note 95, at 9.
145. David Lourie, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8
Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2009).
146. See generally MILYO, supra note 2.
147. Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 126, at 579.
148. See Carpenter, supra note 126, at 570.
149. Id. at 570.
150. Id. at 574–75.
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own political activities should trigger disclosure, the tables turned.151
Fifty-six percent disagreed that their own information should be
publicized—and that figure grew to 71% when disclosure included
their employer.152 When asked why they did not want their
information released, 63% cited a desire to remain anonymous.153
Detailed responses tied to the desire for anonymity were
particularly revealing. Some stated, “Because I do not think it is
anybody’s business what I donate and who I give it to,” and, “I would
not want my name associated with any effort. I would like to remain
anonymous.”154 Respondents also frequently mentioned a concern for
their personal safety or the potential for identity theft: “Because I am
a female and [it’s] risky having that info out there;” “With identity
theft I don’t want my name out there;” and “I wouldn’t donate money
because with all the crazy people out there, I would be frightened if
my name and address were put out there to the public.”155
Other participants saw a relationship between disclosure and a
violation of their private vote: “I don’t want other people to know
how I’m voting,” or, “Because that removes privacy from voting. We
are insured [sic] privacy and the freedom to vote.”156 Still others
noted the opportunity for repercussions. “‘I think it’s an opening for
harassment;’ ‘I don’t think my information should be out there for
fear of retaliations;’ and ‘My privacy would be invaded by the
opposition,’ illustrate such concerns.”157
Respondents also often cited the issue of anonymity when asked
about donating if their employer’s name were disclosed.158 One
concern was over revealing where they work.159 For example, “It’s
not anybody’s business who my employer is and it has nothing to do
with my vote,” or, “My employer’s name is nobody’s business.”160 Of
particular concern was the longevity of their job should their
employer, through mandatory disclosure, learn of the employee’s
beliefs expressed through a contribution: “Because that could

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carpenter, supra note 126, at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).

CARPENTER & MILYO_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:21 PM

NON-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS

625

jeopardize my job;” “I might get fired for that kind of stuff;” and, “If
you were a union member and you vote on another side it would
come back at you and hit you in the face.”161
On the flip-side, others thought mandatory disclosure of the
employer’s name might misrepresent an employer: “It is my choice,
not my employer;” “I don’t think it is appropriate for my employer’s
name to be given out related to what I do;” “Because I don’t know if
he wants his name put out there;” “Because it’s a violation of the
employer’s privacy;” “I don’t want to involve my boss
involuntarily.”162 Still others feared for the negative affect on their
own business: “I am self-employed, and I wouldn’t want that to be
released to the public,” or, “Because I own a business and who I
support is part of my own internal business practices and should not
be public.”163
This concern about the disclosure of personal information
translated into a potential chill on speech.164 When participants were
asked about their likelihood of contributing to a campaign in the face
of disclosure, almost 60% said they would think twice about
contributing when their personal information is disclosed.165 When
asked if they would think twice before donating to a campaign if their
employer’s name was disclosed, the number approached 50%.166
In the abstract, then, citizens may appear to favor disclosure, but
when the consequences of disclosure are personalized, their opinions
change dramatically.167 Moreover, the “fear factor” associated with
disclosure comes at a cost—less political speech.168 And recent
events, including the well-publicized harassment of individuals and
economic boycotts based on disclosed information, likely only
increase the chill associated with compelled disclosure.169
The costs associated with disclosure also come in the form of
substantial burdens on political involvement and association that

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Carpenter, supra note 126, at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
CARPENTER, supra note 94, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carpenter, supra note 126, at 575.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 576.
See Elian Dashev, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First
Amendment Protected Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 207, 247–51 (2011).
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create significant disincentives.170 One way this is done—and one
largely unknown to the average citizen—is through campaign
committee requirements, specifically disclosure, imposed upon
ordinary citizens who band together in an ad hoc fashion to convince
others how to vote.171 In many states that allow ballot issues, any
group that spends more than a certain threshold—sometimes as little
as a few hundred dollars—to tell others how to vote must register
with the state as an issue committee and track and disclose all
fundraising and expenditures.172 These compliance requirements
create an overwhelming and disincentivizing burden.173
To measure just how burdensome the process can be, Milyo gave
255 experimental subjects—mostly graduate students—a hypothetical
campaign issue. He then asked them to fill out the appropriate
paperwork to register a ballot committee called Neighbors United
and comply with reporting requirements of three different,
representative states (California, Colorado, and Missouri).174 The
participants were also asked to complete the forms for specific tasks
common to grassroots issue advocacy, the latter of which included
purchasing and making signs, t-shirts, and the like, or holding
neighborhood information sessions at which refreshments were
served.175 Of the 255 participants, not a single one correctly
completed each of the twenty tasks on the campaign finance
disclosure forms.176 The participant with the highest score correctly
completed only 80% of the tasks.177 The mean correct score was just
41%.178 Had this been a real world exercise, every single participant
could have been liable for violating campaign finance laws.179
In the experiment, the trouble started early: 93% of participants
had no idea that they needed to register as a political committee to
speak out in the first place.180 Without the explicit instructions
provided, participants would have done even worse.181 While

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

MILYO, supra note 2, at 18.
Id. at 2.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
See infra Table 4 (citing MILYO, supra note 2, at 5–6).
MILYO, supra note 2, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reporting simple contributions proved difficult, subjects had even
more trouble with non-monetary contributions—the t-shirts, posters,
flyers, and other supplies that are typical of grassroots activity.182
Even when informed of the fair market value of the objects to be
itemized—not always readily available in the real world—participants
could only report a gift of $8 in refreshments correctly 30% of the
time in California, 36% of the time in Colorado, and 24% of the time
in Missouri.183 Another scenario in which a contributor spent $500 on
t-shirts and then donated them to the group was the most
formidable.184
No one in the California group reported this
transaction correctly, and only 6% in the Colorado group and 14% in
the Missouri group succeeded.185
Subjects were also directed to aggregate multiple donations from
an individual donor in two separate tasks.186 The highest score on
either task from any state was only 7% in California.187 Participants
simply made minor errors in arithmetic that threw off the sum total.188
This illustrates how fines that are levied per violation can
compound.189
Participants were given the opportunity to comment in writing on
their experiences with the disclosure forms and instructions. Ninetyfour of the 255 participants did so.190 Of those, ninety out of ninetyfour expressed frustration with the forms:
“These forms are confusing!”191
“These forms seem lengthy, full of jargon, confusing . . . .”192
“Too complex and not clear.”193
“This is horrible!”194
“My goodness! These were incredibly difficult to understand.”195

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“One truly needs legal counsel to complete these forms . . . .”196
“Seriously, a person needs a lawyer to do this correctly.”197
“Worse than the IRS!”198
“Good Lord!
committee.”199

I would never volunteer to do this for any

“These forms make me feel stupid!”200

Another participant observed:
I serve as the Treasurer of a political coordinating
committee/political action committee formed within the last year.
Even with that limited experience I found this exercise to be
complicated and mentally challenging . . . . The burdensome paper
work and fines imposed for errors in reporting proved to be a hurdle
that prevented the formation of our PAC (that is affiliated with the
non-profit I work for) for a number of years. That being said, in
politics it is important to know the major contributors of our elected
officials and hold contributors and recipients accountable to the
degree possible.201

That is, even a political treasurer sympathetic to mandatory
disclosure (though notably for contributions to elected officials and
not ballot initiatives) failed to comply with the law.202 This fact hints
at something more than just ordinary citizens struggling with
unfamiliar tasks and jargon; when even experienced political wonks
have trouble filling out basic disclosure forms, it raises the concern
that perhaps forms are not intended to be user-friendly.
Milyo also queried subjects about their attitudes toward compelled
disclosure in a debriefing session.203 While this exercise differs from
Carpenter’s survey in that it is not representative, it is nevertheless
interesting to consider the opinions of subjects that have just had a
brush with disclosure regulations. When asked if the paperwork
burden of disclosure alone would deter ordinary citizens from
engaging in independent political activity, 63% agreed.204 When
prompted to consider that mistakes on disclosure forms could result
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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in fines or criminal penalties, 89% agreed that ordinary citizens would
be deterred.205 Milyo concludes that “Subjects were sincerely
frustrated in their attempts to complete the disclosure forms—and
believed that these difficulties would deter political activity.”206 But it
is not just individuals who can be swept up in these disclosure
requirements. So, too, can nonprofit organizations through the
regulation of “electioneering communications.”207
The term “electioneering communications” is most closely
associated with the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
and covers political speech in ads on broadcast media that mentions a
candidate for federal office within thirty days of a primary or sixty
days of a general election.208 Shortly after BCRA’s passage, states
began adopting similar laws, extending the reach beyond candidates
to ballot issues and expanding the scope to things like flyers, the
Internet, billboards, and even hand-lettered signs.209 More than a
dozen states regulate electioneering communications for candidates,
but two states—Illinois210 and Oklahoma211—also include ballot
issues.212 Prior to Broward Coalition v. Browning,213 Florida also
regulated speech concerning ballot issues.214
The consequence of these laws in Oklahoma (and in Florida prior
to Broward Coalition v. Browning) is that nonprofit organizations
(among other types) spending more than $5000 to communicate with
anyone about ballot issues must comply with the same types of
extensive disclosure requirements discussed above.215 Practically
speaking, this includes even non-political civic associations of any size
205. Id.
206. Id. at 15.
207. MICHAEL C. MUNGER, INST. FOR JUST., LOCKING UP POLITICAL SPEECH: HOW
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS LAWS STIFLE FREE SPEECH AND CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT 3 (2009).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.14 (2010).
211. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, Ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-16(c) (2012).
212. See MUNGER, supra note 207, at 1.
213. Broward Coal. of Condos., Homeowners Ass’ns., & Cmty. Orgs., Inc. v.
Browning, No. 4:08-cv-445-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 1457972 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2009).
214. See MUNGER, supra note 207, at 4.
215. See id.
Illinois exempts 501(c)3 organizations from electioneering
communications laws. In Oklahoma, disclosure requirements are also triggered when
an organization speaks to an audience of more than 25,000 people. Given the
unlimited reach of the internet, the audience of 25,000 is met instantly. In Florida, no
such thresholds existed. Even a penny spent in electioneering communications
triggered the disclosure requirements. See id. at 5–7.
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that merely provide information, in newsletters for example, to
Note that the
constituents about forthcoming elections.216
information need not even be advocacy.217 Simply informing others of
what a ballot issue says qualifies as electioneering communications.218
To measure the costs imposed upon such organizations, Munger
surveyed more than one thousand civic groups in Florida.219 These
groups ranged in size from very small community charities to large,
recognized nonprofits.220 His results identified significant concerns
regarding the existence of expensive, burdensome, and intrusive
regulations required of civic groups before they exercise their First
Amendment right to speak about ballot issues.221 Namely, although
less than 1% of the groups have an intrinsically political mission, at
least 30% occasionally communicate with the public about policy
issues, which made them a target of regulation.222 Many of the groups
in the sample were small, with few donations to support their work
and few employees.223 In more than half of the organizations, either
no one kept track of contributions of any kind or one person did the
task part-time.224 This means compliance would have imposed
potentially large costs on these groups and diverted them from their
core missions.225
Particularly troublesome to many in the sample was how disclosure
requirements would have forced most organizations to compromise
donor privacy as a result of speaking about politics, thereby risking
financial support.226 Almost 70% of the groups in the study strongly
resist revealing donor information, and more than 36% of the groups
would have expected a decline in fundraising if they were required to
reveal detailed donor information.227 As Munger concluded, “[f]or
nonprofits that do not want to compromise donor wishes for
anonymity and yet want to keep their support, the best bet in a state

216. See id. at 1.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id. at 10.
219. Id. at 11.
220. This is evident by reviewing organizational demographic responses in
Appendix A. Id. at 20–23.
221. Id. at 17.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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with electioneering communications laws is to stay silent about
politics.”228
IV. DISCUSSION
Freedom of speech and freedom of association are the twin pillars
of American democracy. These principles are so valued that the
Supreme Court permits regulation of money in politics only for the
purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.229
Nevertheless, many states impose complex and onerous disclosure
requirements on political groups participating in ballot measure
elections or grassroots issue advocacy.230 These disclosure regulations
tend to be very similar to those required of political committees
active in candidate elections, even though there is no anti-corruption
rationale for disclosure in non-candidate contexts.231
Policy makers and reform advocates typically assume that the
benefits of disclosure are significant and that the costs are trivial.232
However, recent research consistently finds just the opposite.233 State
disclosure laws require frequent and detailed reports and impose
penalties for non-compliance.234 Large, well-organized and wellfinanced interest groups are probably not much deterred by such redtape costs, but experimental evidence reveals that ordinary citizens
find disclosure requirements to be baffling and intimidating.235
Having been exposed to actual disclosure forms and instructions,
participants in the compliance experiment expressed incredulity at
existing disclosure regulations, and when asked if the process of
complying with such regulations would deter ordinary citizens from
participating in independent political activity, more than 60%
agreed.236
Surveys also reveal that ordinary citizens are tolerant of disclosure
requirements when they are imposed on others, but once they are
asked about revealing detailed information about themselves,

228. Id. at 14.
229. Persily & Lammie, supra note 3, at 125.
230. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 2–3; MILYO, supra note 4, at 1.
231. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 18.
232. See Hasen, supra note 77, at 266.
233. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 21; MUNGER, supra note 207, at 18; Carpenter,
supra note 126, at 579.
234. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 3.
235. See id. at 5.
236. Id. at 16.
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respondents demur.237 Roughly 60% prefer to remain anonymous
when supporting political causes and 71% object to providing
employer information.238
It isn’t just ordinary citizens that find disclosure costly. Surveys of
civic groups also reveal widespread concern and dissatisfaction with
mandatory disclosure.239 The costs of disclosure, in red-tape and
chilled political participation, are undeniably real. But what of the
supposed benefits?
Proponents of mandatory disclosure in non-candidate contexts
argue that transparency is an important end in itself.240 In effect, they
argue that the public has a “right to know” who is speaking and that
disclosure confers vital information to voters.241 However, claims
regarding the efficacy of mandatory disclosure are simply not well
supported in theory or in empirical analyses.242
The claim that financial disclosure constitutes an informative cue is
logically flawed. There is no reason to believe that cognitive
shortcuts necessarily yield better decisions. Further, voters are
inundated with more readily accessible and understandable cues from
parties243 and endorsements,244 as well as actual information from
media sources and campaigns themselves.245 In a world of low-cost
and abundant information, the marginal benefit of details about
contributors that give as little as $25 to a political cause are not likely
to be very great.246 Recent empirical studies confirm that the
marginal value of compelled disclosure is nil.247
In summary, the small but growing literature that examines state
disclosure laws finds negligible information benefits,248 but potentially
large hassle costs associated with such regulations—costs that impose
a non-trivial burden on First Amendment rights.249 While the studies

237. Carpenter, supra note 126, at 579.
238. Id. at 572.
239. See MUNGER, supra note 207, at 22.
240. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 5, at 299–300.
241. See Briffault, supra note 76, at 276.
242. See PRIMO, supra note 95, at 20.
243. See Huckfeldt et al., supra note 72, at 891–93.
244. See Forehand et al., supra note 89, at 2228.
245. See PRIMO, supra note 95, at 10; Carpenter, supra note 126, at 568.
246. See PRIMO, supra note 95, at 18–19.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See MILYO, supra note 2, at 21; MUNGER, supra note 207, at 2; Carpenter,
supra note 126, at 579.
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reviewed here examine the costs and benefits of disclosure mainly for
ballot measure elections, the required disclosure tasks for grassroots
issue advocacy are very similar, and so the lessons from this literature
should apply to both contexts.250
Given the dearth of empirical support for the prevailing view that
disclosure is both vital to the integrity of democracy and costless to
society, some rethinking of disclosure regulations in the states is in
order. As two campaign finance scholars noted, “[i]t is all too normal
for legislators to pass laws, accept praise, and then not worry about
implementation. In a field such as campaign finance . . . this is
particularly foolish . . . A poorly implemented law in this field may as
well be no law at all.”251
Our review of state disclosure laws reveals that states mandate
registration and reporting of political activities at fairly low levels of
activity. Since there is no anti-corruption rationale for disclosure in
non-candidate contexts, an obvious reform is to eliminate mandatory
disclosure for ballot measure elections and grass roots advocacy.
Indeed, citizens in fourteen states appear to navigate state politics just
fine despite the absence of state disclosure rules for grassroots
lobbying.252
Absent the repeal of disclosure laws in non-candidate contexts, the
next best alternative may be to raise the activity thresholds for groups
to register and report activities. Further, there is no reason to impose
the same disclosure rules of contributors to candidates on
contributors to ballot measure campaigns or grassroots issue
advocacy campaigns. State policymakers should reconsider the need
for collecting information on contributor identities (let alone
contributors’ employers) in non-candidate elections. Above all, in
campaign finance regulation in non-candidate contexts, the
presumption should be on the side of free speech and association.
Those who advocate for greater regulation should bear the burden of
proof in demonstrating empirically real benefits from such
regulations, particularly in light of evidence of non-trivial costs.

250. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 22.
251. See Thomas Gais & Michael Malbin, Campaign Finance Reform, 34 SOCIETY
56, 61 (1997).
252. See MILYO, supra note 4, at 8.
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Table 1. Selected Disclosure Requirements for Ballot Measure
Committees (Minimum Dollar Thresholds)253

Register as
Committee
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Illinois
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Utah
Washington
Wyoming

500
500
500
1,000
200
500
500
3,000
5,000
0
500
200
500
0
5,000
10,000
0
0
500
0
500
50
0/5,000*
0

Itemize Contributions:
Include Name
Include Employer
and Address
or Occupation
0
25
50
100
20
0
50
150
50
50
0
200
100
35
250
1,000
100
0
50
100
100
50
25
25

250
25
100
100
100
500
50
200
100
200
100
35
100
50
100
50
100
-

Itemize
Expenditures
0
0
100
100
20
100
25
150
100
50
50
200
100
0
250
1,000
100
25
50
100
50
50
0

* The second figure represents threshold for reporting requirements. Full reporting
also triggered by single contributor givingmore than $500 in aggregate.

253. Milyo, supra note 8, at 23 tbl.7 (author compilation from state government
websites on campaign finance disclosure).
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Table 2. Definitions of Lobbying in the States254
Direct communication with public
officials

Direct and indirect communication
with public officials

Any attempt to influence public
officials

254. Milyo, supra note 4, at 8 tbl.1.

Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa (lobbying the
executive branch), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming
Alabama, Florida, Iowa (lobbying the legislature),
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
South Dakota, Washington
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Table 3. Thresholds for Reporting Grassroots Lobbying Activity in
the States255
Alabama – any employment or $100 in expenses
Alaska – 10 hours employment in a 30 day period
Arkansas – $400 in compensation or expenses in a 90 day period
California – $5,000 compensation or expenses
Colorado – any employment
Connecticut – $2,000 in compensation or expenses
Florida – any employment
Georgia – $250 in compensation or expenses
Hawaii – 5 hours employment per month or $750 in expenses in a 30 day period
Iowa – any employment or $1,000 in expenses
Idaho – paid $250 in a 90 day period
Indiana – $500 in compensation
Kansas – any employment or $100 in expenses
Maryland – $2,000 in compensation or expenses
Massachusetts – $250 in compensation or expenses
Minnesota – $3,000 in compensation, or $250 in expenses
Mississippi – $200 in compensation or expenses
Missouri – any employment
Montana – $2,500 in compensation
Nebraska – any employment
New Hampshire – any employment
New Jersey – $100 compensation or expenses in a 90 day period
New Mexico – any employment
New York – $5,000 in compensation
North Carolina – $3,000 compensation or expenses in a 90 day period
North Dakota – no threshold
Oregon – $200 in compensation or expenses in a 30 day period (or $500 in 90 days)
Pennsylvania – $2,500 in compensation or 20 hours in any quarter
Rhode Island – no threshold
South Dakota – any employment
Tennessee – any employment or 10 days
Virginia – $500 in compensation or expenses
Vermont – $500 in compensation or expenses
Washington – $500 in compensation or expenses in any 30 day period (or $1,000 in 90 days)
West Virginia – $200 in compensation or expenses in any 30 day period (or $500 in 90 days)
Wyoming – any compensation or expenses

255. Milyo, supra note 4, at 10 tbl.2. Annual thresholds unless otherwise indicated.
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Table 4. Selected Tasks for Neighbors United256

Task
Register as political committee
Statement declaring position on
ballot issue
Reporting initial funds on hand
Record $2,000 check contribution
Record Anonymous $15 cash
contribution
Record Illegal Anonymous $1,000
Contribution
Record Non-Monetary
Contribution of $8 in refreshments
Record Non-Monetary
Contribution of $40 in supplies
Record Non-Monetary
Contribution of $500 in t-shirts
Report expenditure of $1,500 for a
newspaper advertisement
(No miscellaneous clerical errors
on all tasks)

Percentage of Participants Completing Task Correctly
California
Colorado
Missouri
25%
72%
82%
36%

n.a.

n.a.

44%
60%

67%
72%

52%
80%

69%

51%

77%

2%

3%

8%

30%

36%

24%

18%

46%

26%

0%

6%

14%

49%

89%

72%

5%

6%

2%

256. Dick M. Carpenter, Jeffrey Milyo & John K. Ross, Politics for Professionals
Only: Ballot Measures, Campaign Finance “Reform,” and the First Amendment,
ENGAGE, Oct. 2009, at 80, 83 tbl.1.

